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Cryptocurrencies’ Revolt Against the BSA:
Why the Supreme Court Should Hold that the
Bank Secrecy Act Violates the Fourth
Amendment
Jeremy Ciarabellini*

“It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in the mildest and least
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get
their footing first in that way, namely, by silent approaches and
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be
obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for
the security of person and property should be liberally construed.”1
“In the new economy, it is as important to have access to a basic
bank account and financial services as it is to have access to
electricity, running water, and a telephone.2

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) creates a Hobson’s choice: one
must either struggle to function in modern society without a bank
account or submit to financial surveillance by the government. Both
* Jeremy Ciarabellini is a graduate of Seattle University School of Law where he
earned both a Juris Doctor (2015) and an L.L.M in Innovation and Technology
Law (2018). He specializes in electric transmission law and finds additional
academic interests in privacy law and brain–computer interface law. Jeremy
thanks his family, professors, and SJTEIL for their depthless support as he wrote
this article.
1

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
Michael A. Stegman, Banking the Unbanked: Untapped Market Opportunities
for North Carolina’s Financial Institutions, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 23 (2001)
(citing Lawrence H. Summers, Helping Americans To Save More, Remarks at the
Choose to Save Forum (April 2, 2000)).
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choices result in drastic consequences. The following two stories
illustrate these consequences.
A. Story One
Ariel Schwartz tried to live without a bank account for a
single day.3 As part of a simulation to determine what it is like to
function without a bank account, Ariel had two hours to purchase
and load a prepaid card, cash both a payroll and a personal check,
send those checks, pick up a money transfer, and finally pay rent.4
Ariel described this simulation as an “exhausting experience.”5
The first payday loan and cash advance business Ariel tried
to use refused to cash her checks. The business turned her down
because it could not readily verify that the checks were legitimate.
A second business was willing to cash the checks but for a
“significantly higher fee;” however, that same business refused to
let her pay $10 of the rent bill for “unspecified reasons.”6
Ariel then went to Western Union to send and receive her
money transfers. There, she could not receive funds, being told by
Western Union that part of its system was down.7 However, while
Western Union did allow Ariel to send a money transfer of $30, it
concurrently imposed a $5 fee.8 In the two-hour deadline, these were
all of the tasks that Ariel was able to complete.9
B. Story Two
Ken Quran immigrated to America to provide for his
family. Over the next seventeen years, Ken owned and worked in
his convenience store.11 Despite working seventy hours per week,
Ken and his family had time to become American citizens.12
During his seventeen-year career, Ken saved $150,000 for
his retirement, “[b]ut his American dream [became] a legal
10

3

Ariel Schwartz, What It’s Like to Live Without A Bank Account For A Day, FAST
CO. (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.fastcompany.com/3039201/what-its-like-tolive-without-a-bank-account-for-a-day [https://perma.cc/XYS8-JT5G].
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Nick Sibilla, How An Obscure Banking Law Let The IRS Seize Bank Accounts
From Innocent Americans, FORBES (July 17, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/instituteforjustice/2015/07/17/how-an-obscure-banking-law-let-the-irsseize-bank-accounts-from-innocent-americans/#300b06f95361
[https://perma.cc/Z2MS-YM7Y].
11
Id.
12
Id.
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nightmare.”13 Ken’s bank reported him to the government because
it believed that he was violating the anti-structuring provision of the
Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) because of how Ken was withdrawing cash
from his account.14 Ken did not know that his actions could be seen
as violations of the BSA. Ken also did not know that he was reported
to the government until the day government agents stormed his
store, prevented customers from entering, searched the area with a
dog, and interrogated him.15 According to Ken, the government
agents coerced him to sign a civil forfeiture form, and the
government agents then seized all of his cash.16 The government
never charged Ken with a crime.17
C. The Bank Secrecy Act Created This Reality
The intersection of these two stories begs the question: Does
the Fourth Amendment protect United States citizens’ banking
information against warrantless searches and seizures by the
government? “No,” declared Congress by enacting the BSA and the
Supreme Court in holding that the BSA is constitutional.
According to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
the purpose of the BSA is to combat money laundering, terrorism,
and other criminal activities.18 Undoubtedly, this aim is legitimate.
However, in the pursuit of protecting its citizens under the Bank
Secrecy Act, Congress gave law enforcement the power to search
citizens’ private bank records without obtaining a warrant. After the
BSA’s enactment, the Supreme Court upheld these warrantless
searches as constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court came to that holding in United States v. Miller,
where it applied the “third-party doctrine.”19 Broadly, this doctrine
holds that information voluntarily disclosed to a third party is not
subject to Fourth Amendment protections.20 Applying the thirdparty doctrine, the Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment does
not demand an authorized search warrant before the government can
search an individual’s bank records because there is no
constitutionally protected privacy interest in such records. By
voluntarily providing their financial information to a bank,
individuals abandon their privacy interests in that information,
13

Id.
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/bsa/indexbsa.html [https://perma.cc/VMQ5-V2K3].
19
See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
20
Id. at 443.
14
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accepting the risk that the bank may not keep their information
confidential.
The Court was wrong. It inappropriately applied the thirdparty doctrine in its original form—as an outgrowth of a previously
overruled Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. This form of the thirdparty doctrine excludes all voluntarily disclosed information from
Fourth Amendment protections. Instead, the Supreme Court should
have examined the third-party doctrine though the lens of the Katz
test. The Katz test provides Fourth Amendment protection where
society would consider it reasonable.21 This test is more flexible and
would have allowed the Court to strike down the BSA as
unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court’s mistake in Miller should render that
opinion with little precedential value and invite the Court to reexamine the constitutionality of the BSA. Applying the Katz test to
modern financial practices strongly suggests that the BSA is
anathema to the Fourth Amendment because modern living requires
the use of a bank account for active participation in society. Thus,
the assertion that an individual’s choice to have a bank account is
wholly voluntary can hardly be argued. Further, the emergence of
cryptocurrencies provides evidence that society expects financial
privacy, as financial privacy and autonomy are core values in
cryptocurrency theory. For these reasons, the Court should rule that
the BSA’s allowance of warrantless disclosure of financial
information to the government violates the Fourth Amendment
protection against warrantless searches and seizures.
This article proceeds in analyzing the constitutionality of the
BSA as to banks in light of the emergence of cryptocurrencies. For
this analysis, this article will specifically apply the Katz test to the
banking industry. However, as stated in Part II.B.1, the BSA’s
mandatory reporting provisions apply to a wide range of businesses,
consequently providing a broad impact on citizens’ privacy
expectations against their government far beyond banks. The
broader societal impact of the BSA thus deserves attention, but it is
beyond the scope of the present article.
Within the stated scope, this article proceeds as follows:
Section II details the creation of the BSA and explains its reporting
requirements as specific to banks. This section intends to show that
the BSA is a strict criminal statute that leaves banks with no choice
but to over-report their customers’ transactions to the government.
Section III transitions to Fourth Amendment principles. Arguing
that the Supreme Court in Miller misconceptualized the third-party
doctrine Section III begins with a careful look at the line of cases
developing the third-party doctrine. It then shows how the Court
failed to recognize that the later emergence of the Katz test undercut
21

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
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the reasoning of the third-party doctrine. Section III concludes by
describing and critiquing the Miller opinion itself. Section IV looks
at the BSA in the context of the modern era. It argues that society
would now recognize as reasonable an individual’s privacy
expectation in banking information—an indicator of constitutional
protection under the Katz test. Arguing that the BSA violates the
Fourth Amendment, the final section looks to bank accounts as
involuntary realities of society and cryptocurrencies as a refute to
the BSA’s constitutionality.
II.

THE BANK SECRECY ACT:
HISTORY, FORM, & FUNCTION

Congress enacted the BSA “in 1970 following extensive
hearings concerning the unavailability of foreign and domestic bank
records of customers thought to be engaged in activities entailing
criminal or civil liability.”22 Congress intended the BSA to address
two major areas related to law enforcement-assisted banking: (1)
financial recordkeeping by domestic banks and (2) United States
citizens’ use of foreign banks to hide their money.23
Specific to laws and regulations aimed at domestic banks,
the BSA enabled a wholesale financial surveillance regime. Because
banks must report all transactions above $5,000 and any transaction
that looks “suspicious” to the government, “banks are paying
attention to even the smallest of . . . transactions.”24 Indeed, “antimoney laundering” software allows banks to automatically monitor
approximately 50 million financial transactions per day looking for
suspicious or unordinary activity.25 While Congress’s intent in
passing the BSA may have been altruistic, the specific provisions of
the BSA fail to follow a core constitutional principle: If criminal
activity “is to be fought, those who fight it must respect the rights of
individuals, whether or not those individuals are suspected of having
committed a crime.”26

22

California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 26 (1974).
H.R. Rep. 91-975 (1970).
24
John Borland, The Technology That Toppled Eliot Spitzer, MIT TECHNOLOGY
REVIEW (Mar. 19, 2008), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/409766/thetechnology-that-toppled-eliot-spitzer/ [https://perma.cc/26XP-JCMS].
25
Id.
26
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991).
23
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A. Historical Development
The origins of the BSA are unique, beginning with
Switzerland’s defiance against Adolf Hitler.27 During World War II,
Hitler sought to seize assets that German Jews deposited into Swiss
bank accounts for safekeeping.28 To prevent Hitler’s plundering of
those assets and for the protection of “legitimate business secrets,”
Switzerland passed a series of statutes criminalizing the release of
depositors’ identities.29
While the Swiss banking system attempted to overcome
Hitler’s evil intentions, it quickly became a place where Nazi leaders
themselves would deposit valuables stolen during their conquests.30
Subsequently in the 1960s, the United States became deeply
concerned that its citizens were using the same system for illegal
purposes.31 As the “jet age” facilitated increased travel, the Swiss
banking system became available to more people.32 Some of these
individuals took advantage of Swiss banks’ strict secrecy laws to
avoid culpability for several crimes, from illegal securities
participation to organized crime’s laundering of money “skimmed”
from Las Vegas casinos.33
In 1968, Congress began looking into these issues in
earnest.34 Congress invited numerous government agencies to speak
at hearings documenting the relationship between crime and secrecy
havens. Multiple law enforcement agencies testified to Congress
that the United States lacked the necessary legal framework to
identify and prosecute individuals involved in financial crimes
linked to secret bank accounts.35 The combination of timeconsuming foreign legal processes and secrecy laws often prevented
law enforcement from obtaining admissible evidence of financial
crimes.36 Domestically, the government estimated that the use of
secret bank accounts cost the government loss of tax revenues in the
27

Legal and Economic Impact of Foreign Banking Procedures on the United
States: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 6 (1968), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.$b654959;
view=1up;seq=9;size=150 [https://perma.cc/4RX3-K5YK]
[hereinafter Legal and Economic Impact].
28
Id.; see also James E. Eldridge, The Bank Secrecy Act; Privacy, Comity, and
the Politics of Contraband, 11 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 667, 668 (1986).
29
Legal and Economic Impact, supra note 27.
30
Swiss banks and Nazi gold, THE ECONOMIST (July 2, 1998),
http://www.economist.com/node/139987 [https://perma.cc/LMR4-565C].
31
Id.
32
Id. at 9-10.
33
Id.
34
James E. Eldridge, The Bank Secrecy Act; Privacy, Comity, and the Politics of
Contraband, 11 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 667, 669 (1986).
35
Id. at 669-72.
36
California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 29 (1974).
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hundreds of millions of dollars.37 A former U.S. Attorney described
the use of secret bank accounts “as the largest single tax loophole
permitted by American law.”38
As Congress intended to close criminals’ use of foreign bank
accounts, it also believed that it needed to increase law
enforcement’s access to domestic bank accounts to investigate
criminal activity. As the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) puts it,
Congress passed the BSA “in response to increasing reports of
people bringing bags full of currency of doubtful origin” for deposit
into banks.”39 In response to these problems, Congress enacted the
BSA.40
Yet, Congress did not pass the BSA in a vacuum; it came in
the greater context of President Richard Nixon’s war on drugs.41 In
1970, President Nixon signed a suite of additional laws designed to
provide law enforcement with multiple avenues of criminal
prosecution of drug crimes,42 including the Controlled Substances
Act (CSA), the Organized Crime Control Act (OCCA), and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).43 The
CSA criminalized actions such as drug manufacturing and
distribution.44 Nevertheless, when a law enforcement agency fails to
gather sufficient evidence for prosecution under the CSA, that
agency may still have sufficient evidence to prosecute under OCCA,
RICO, or the BSA. Both OCCA and RICO target criminal activity,
while the BSA criminalized entry of ill-gotten money into the
banking system.45
Therefore, the BSA emerged as a tool to combat criminal
activity. The specific provisions of the BSA cast a wide net to
achieve its goals. In its original form, the Supreme Court recognized
that there was “no denying the impressive sweep of the authority
conferred upon the Secretary [of the Treasury] by the [BSA].”46

37

Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.
39
4.26.5 Bank Secrecy Act History and Law, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
INTERNAL REVENUE MANUALS (2012), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04026-005#idm139674414931904 [https://perma.cc/R7HH-8QB4].
40
Eldridge, supra note 34.
41
Steven Wisotsky, Exposing The War On Cocaine: The Futility And
Destructiveness of Prohibition, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 1305, 1306 (1983).
42
Id. at 1353-54.
43
Id.
44
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 802(6), 812(c).
45
Patrick A. Tighe, Underbanked: Cooperative Banking as a Potential Solution
To The Marijuana-Banking Problem, 114 MICH. L. REV. 803, 808-10 (2016).
46
California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 30 (1974).
38
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B. Rules
The current version of the BSA is codified at 31 U.S.C. §§
5311-5332. Throughout its existence, Congress has expanded the
scope of the BSA. As currently enacted, the purpose of the BSA is
“to require certain reports or records where they have a high degree
of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or
proceedings, or in the conduct of intelligence or counterintelligence
activities, including analysis, to protect against international
terrorism.”47 The law enforcement arm of the BSA says that the act
requires U.S. financial institutions to assist U.S.
government agencies to detect and prevent money
laundering. Specifically, the act requires financial
institutions to keep records of cash purchases of
negotiable instruments, file reports of cash
transactions exceeding $10,000 (daily aggregate
amount), and to report suspicious activity that might
signify money laundering, tax evasion, or other
criminal activities.48
To avoid these penalties, a broad range of institutions must be
prepared to follow precise rules.
In general, “financial institutions” must maintain a variety of
records, including their customers’ identities, copies of certain
checks, and reports on certain domestic and foreign currency
transactions, all as proscribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.49
Additionally, the BSA considers a broad array of businesses as
“financial institutions.” Organizations designated as “financial
institutions” include banks, private bankers, credit unions, brokers
or dealers in securities or commodities, currency exchanges,
operators of credit card systems, insurance companies,
pawnbrokers, loan and finance companies, travel agencies, car
dealerships, certain casinos, and more.50 To accomplish the BSA’s
domestic law enforcement goals, these financial institutions must
follow detailed requirements under the threat of severe punishment
for noncompliance.

47

31 U.S.C. § 5311. The Secretary of the Treasury has also determined that the
reports required under the BSA “have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax,
[and] regulatory investigations or proceedings.” 31 C.F.R. § 1010.301.
48
FinCEN's Mandate from Congress, U.S. DEP'T OF TREAS.,
https://www.fincen.gov/resources/fincens-mandate-congress
[https://perma.cc/VBW7-2X54].
49
31 U.S.C. §§ 5313(a), 5314(a); California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S.
21, 30 (1974).
50
31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) (2004).
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1. Domestic Bank Reporting Requirements
Banks carry a particularly heavy regulatory burden under the
BSA. To begin, they must file a report for every deposit, withdraw,
exchange, payment, transfer, or other type of transaction involving
more than $10,000.51 These reports must “verify and record the
name and address of the individual presenting a transaction, as well
as record the identity, account number, and the social security or
taxpayer-identification number, if any, of any person or entity on
whose behalf such transaction is to be effected.”52
Moreover, the BSA limits distributing specific monetary
instruments in amounts of over $3,000,53 whereby banks may not
“issue or sell a bank check, cashier's check, traveler's check, or
money order to any individual in connection with a transaction or
group of such contemporaneous transactions involving United
States coins or currency (or such other monetary instruments as the
Secretary may prescribe) in amounts or denominations of $3,000 or
more . . . .”54 The only exceptions to this rule require banks to verify
the identity of the purchaser and keep records of the transaction,
which they must provide to the federal government upon request of
the Secretary of the Treasury.55
Whenever any of these conditions are met, banks must send
their reports directly to the Secretary of the Treasury.56 While these
provisions of the BSA may seem mechanical in their nature of action
and response, the BSA also requires banks to actively monitor for
suspicious activity—a much vaguer and, ultimately, far-reaching
mandate.
2. Suspicious Activity Reporting Requirements
In addition to the bright-line reporting requirements
mentioned above, banks must also submit Suspicious Activity
Reports (SARs) under certain circumstances.57 The BSA empowers
the Secretary of the Treasury to decide the parameters of this rule,
stating that “The Secretary may require any financial institution, and
any director, officer, employee, or agent of any financial institution,

51

31 C.F.R. § 1010.311. For purposes of reaching the $10,000 threshold, the
Secretary of the Treasury aggregates all transactions made during a single
business day by or on behalf of any person. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.313.
52
31 C.F.R. § 1010.312 (2011).
53
31 U.S.C. § 5325 (1988).
54
31 U.S.C. § 5325(a) (1988).
55
31 U.S.C. § 5325(a)-(b) (1988).
56
31 U.S.C. § 5312(c)(1)(C) (2004).
57
31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(1) (2014).
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to report any suspicious transaction relevant to a possible violation
of law or regulation.”58
For banks, the BSA delineates two types of SARs: required
SARs and voluntary SARs. Required SARs can be broken into two
categories: illegal-transaction SARs and unexplainable-activity
SARs. Banks are required to file illegal-transaction SARs anytime
they know, suspect, or have reason to suspect that a transaction of
$5,000 or more involves money “derived from illegal activity or are
intended to hide funds from illegal activities . . . as part of a plan to
violate or avoid any Federal law or regulation…” or other reporting
requirement of the BSA.59 For unexplainable-activity SARs, a bank
must file a report on any transaction that the bank feels “has no
business or apparent lawful purpose or is not the sort in which the
particular customer would normally be expected to engage, and the
bank knows of no reasonable explanation for the transaction after
examining the available facts, including the background and
possible purpose of the transaction.”60
On the other hand, banks have quite a bit of discretion for
voluntary SARs. For any activity that does not require reporting, a
bank may still file a SAR on a transaction if “it believes [the
information would be] relevant to the possible violation of any”
federal mandate.61
For both types of SARs, the reporting bank must file the
SAR with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) no
later than thirty calendar days after discovering the facts that
constitute the basis of the SAR and must make the supporting
documentation available for inspection at the federal government’s
request.62 The bank must maintain the supporting documentation for
five years.63 Moreover, SARs are strictly confidential, and a bank
many not disclose its existence to the individual to whom the
transaction pertains.64
3. Incentives to Report
The BSA imposes significant legal consequences on banks
for noncompliance, and also conversely provides civil immunity on
compliant banks as well as a potential reward for reporting. To avoid
violations in the first instance, the BSA requires that banks

58

Id.
31 C.F.R. § 1020.320(a)(2)(i)-(ii) (2011).
60
31 C.F.R. § 1020.320(a)(2)(iii) (2011).
61
31 C.F.R. § 1020.320(a)(1) (2011).
62
31 C.F.R. § 1020.320(b)(3), (d) (2011).
63
31 C.F.R. § 1020.320(b)(1), (d) (2011).
64
31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2) (2014); see also 31 C.F.R. § 1020.320(e) (2011)
(regulation specific to banks).
59
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“maintain appropriate procedures to ensure compliance with [the
BSA] . . . to guard against money laundering.”65
If a BSA violation does occur, the potential civil fines are
quite large. For example, a bank that willfully violates a reporting
requirement of a domestic transaction can be held liable for a civil
penalty of at least $25,000 and up to $100,000 per violation per
day.66 If BSA violations are the result of negligence rather than
willfulness, the Secretary of the Treasury has the discretion to
impose no more than $500 on the bank. If that negligent action is
part of a pattern of negligent activity, the maximum fine the
Secretary of the Treasury can impose is increased to $50,000.67
In addition to civil liabilities, BSA violations can give rise to
criminal culpability.68 A single violation of a domestic transaction
reporting requirement of the BSA by an individual carries a fine of
up to $250,000, up to five years of imprisonment, or both.69 If that
individual’s violation is part of additional illegal activity or a pattern
of illegal activity that involves more than $100,000 in one year, the
mandatory sanctions are increased to a fine of up to $500,000, up to
10 years of imprisonment, or both.70
On the other hand, the BSA does provide a degree of
compliance immunity and incentives to banks and individuals. First,
banks may not be held civilly liable by customers for revealing their
banking information in SARs.71 Second, if an individual employee
of a bank reports to the government that the bank, or any of its
employees, is “possibly” in violation of the BSA, the bank is
prohibited from retaliating against the whistleblowing employee.72
Finally, any individual that provides original information leading to
a recovery of a criminal fine, civil penalty, or forfeiture, for a
violation of the BSA in excess of $50,000 is eligible for an award of
either 25% of the money collected by the government or $150,000,
whichever is less.73
In sum, the BSA requires banks to closely monitor their
customers, resulting in banks filing of a considerable number of
SARs over fear of governmental enforcement actions. The banks
must file these reports to FinCEN, which in turn uses the reports for
criminal investigations.

65

31 U.S.C. § 5318(a)(2) (2014).
31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(1) (2004).
67
31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(6)(B) (2004).
68
31 U.S.C. § 5321(d) (2004) (emphasis added).
69
31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (2001).
70
31 U.S.C. § 5322(b) (2001).
71
31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(3)(A) (2014).
72
31 U.S.C. § 5328(a) (2001).
73
31 U.S.C. § 5323(a)-(b) (1984); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.930(a)-(b) (2011).
66
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C. FinCEN and BSA Effectiveness
As required under regulation, banks send their SARs to
FinCEN. Established in 1990, FinCEN operates under the Assistant
Secretary for Enforcement of the Department of the Treasury.74 The
stated mission of FinCEN “is to provide a governmentwide,
multisource intelligence and analytical network in support of the
detection, investigation, and prosecution of domestic and
international money laundering and other financial crimes by
Federal, State, local, and foreign law enforcement agencies.”75 To
achieve its mission, FinCEN is tasked with “analyzing and
disseminating” all the data it collects to federal and state law
enforcement agencies to “[i]dentify possible criminal targets” and
to support ongoing criminal financial investigations.76 FinCEN’s
reports to law enforcement agencies include instances of banks’
non-compliance with the BSA.77
Statistics from recent years suggest that FinCEN contributes
to high rates of successful prosecutions under the BSA but
investigates a relatively low percentage of SARs. According to the
IRS, from 2009 to 2016, the total number of BSA anti-money
laundering investigations, indictments, and successful convictions
has remained relatively constant. For example, in the fiscal year
2009, FinCEN initiated 624 investigations, which led to 289
indictments and a conviction rate of 75.5%.78 In 2011, there were
795 money laundering investigations initiated, resulting in 462
indictments and a 75.3% conviction rate.79 The most recent data set
available is from 2016, showing 504 investigations, 399
indictments, and a conviction rate of 74.8%.80 These statistics
include “investigations from Suspicious Activity Report
(SAR) Review Teams, violations of BSA filing requirements, and
all” other related requirements.”81
However, the total number of SARs reported compared to
the total number of investigations and indictments suggests a
massive problem of overreporting. In 2009, FinCEN received

74

Organization, Functions, and Authority Delegations, 55 Fed. Reg. 18, 433-03,
§ 1 (1990).
75
Id. at § 2.
76
Id. at § 4(d)(1)-(2).
77
Id. at § 4(d)(3).
78
Statistical Data – Money Laundering and Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/compliance/criminal-investigation/statistic
al-data-money-laundering-bank-secrecy-act-bsa [https://perma.cc/9P8J-V3TL].
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
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720,309 SARs from depository institutions alone.82 That number
increased to 798,688 SARs in 201183 and 958,537 in 2016.84
One cannot deny that society benefits from the Federal
Government’s pursuit of eliminating money-laundering, especially
in the context of drugs, organized crime, and terrorism. However,
the expansiveness of the BSA’s directives and resulting
investigations raises significant Fourth Amendment issues. Justice
William Brandeis stated:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard
to protect liberty when the government's purposes are
beneficent. [Individuals] born to freedom are
naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by
evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty
lurk in insidious encroachment by [individuals] of
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.85
Yet, the Supreme Court failed to evaluate the BSA under the
proper Fourth Amendment standards. Thus, the Supreme
Court allowed Congress to encroach upon its citizens’
constitutional rights.
III.

THE BANK SECRECY ACT AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

In United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court held that the
BSA’s requirement that banks report suspicious customer activity
did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures.86 In its conclusion, the Supreme
Court relied on the third-party doctrine, stating that individuals do
not retain privacy interests in information shared with banks.87
Based on the underlying policy of the third-party doctrine and thenrecent developments in Fourth Amendment conceptions, the
Supreme Court erred in its ruling.
More precisely, the Supreme Court developed the thirdparty doctrine in an era when Fourth Amendment protections were
82

FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, THE SAR ACTIVITY REVIEW –
BY THE NUMBERS, FINCEN.GOV, https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/
sar_report/sar_by_numb_18.pdf [https://perma.cc/GCH5-RRT6].
83
Id.
84
FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, SAR STATS – ISSUE 3 –
DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS, SAR STATS TECHNICAL BULLETIN, FINCEN.GOV
(Mar. 2017), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/sar_report/2017-0309/SAR%20Stats%203.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AUK-LL2L].
85
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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See U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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based on trespass principles.88 However, shortly before Miller, the
Supreme Court held that Fourth Amendment rights protected
“people, not places.”89 Thus displacing the traditional trespassbased analysis, the Supreme Court looked, in part, at whether
society would consider a particular search reasonable in the absence
of a warrant. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not analyze
Miller in this new fashion and instead reverted to the traditional
trespass-based analysis of the Fourth Amendment under the guise of
the third-party doctrine.90
A. Fourth Amendment Protection Against Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures
The United States Constitution does not have a general
provision protecting privacy. Instead, it grants only a few, specific
privacy rights. For example, the Fourth Amendment prevents the
government from unreasonably peering into the lives of its citizens:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.91
Fourth Amendment protections are currently analyzed under the
Katz test.92 Broadly, the Katz test states that a court must analyze
and determine whether the actions taken by the government are
considered a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment.93 If the
court does not find a reasonable “objective” privacy interest
implicated by the government’s action, the Fourth Amendment is
not implicated.94 Similarly, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated
if the court cannot find that the defendant had a “subject” privacy
interest invaded by the government’s action.95
Then, if the Fourth Amendment applies, the court will
determine whether the search or seizure was “reasonable.”96 If the
search was for law enforcement purposes, “reasonableness”
88

See infra Part III.A.1.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
90
See Miller, 425 U.S. 435.
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U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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See id.
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See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381 (2014).
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generally requires the government to have first obtained a warrant
authorized by a neutral magistrate that is supported by probable
cause.97 In the absence of a warrant, the search is only reasonable
if it “falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement”
and is supported by probable cause.98
However, the Katz test is relatively new. Until the 1960s, the
court used a “trespass” test: if the government was not physically
trespassing in a private space, it was not violating the Fourth
Amendment.99 The third-party doctrine developed from this view
of the Fourth Amendment, and its strict application became a
powerful tool for law enforcement. With the emergence of the Katz
test, on the other hand, the justifications supporting the strict
application of the third-party doctrine have been severely
diminished.
Two years after it adopted the Katz test, the Supreme Court
had the opportunity to apply it to the BSA in United States v.
Miller.100 But, instead of providing a robust analysis of the BSA
under the Katz test, the Supreme Court defaulted to the
anachronistic conceptions of the third-party doctrine.101
Specifically, the Court in Miller mistakenly relied on the line of
cases which created the third-party doctrine without recognizing
how Katz undercut its reasoning in those cases.102
This and other missteps in analysis provides grounds for the
Supreme Court to revisit the question of the BSA’s
constitutionality. The following sections explain (1) the evolution
of the third-party doctrine, the Katz test, and how the Supreme
Court initially tried to reconcile the two; (2) the Miller case; and
(3) why the Court’s decision in Miller was wrong.
1. Historical Development of the Third-Party Doctrine
The Fourth Amendment does not apply where the third-party
doctrine does.103 The third-party doctrine states that “a person has
no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily
97

See, e.g., Id. at 382.
See, e.g., Id.
99
See, e.g., Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
100
See U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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See infra Part III.B.
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E.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979). For ease of reading, I
use the common description of the doctrine as being an “exception” to the Fourth
Amendment. However, the use of “exception” is imprecise—it assumes that the
Fourth Amendment initially applies to a particular situation and then the thirdparty doctrine functions as a reprieve. In fact, the third-party doctrine is the initial
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the realm of Fourth Amendment law.
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turns over to third parties.”104 Over time, the Supreme Court
expanded the third-party doctrine into a binary inquiry “in which
any information disclosed to a third party for any reason is public
and does not merit Fourth Amendment protection.”105 The thirdparty doctrine was the result of the Court’s trespass-based
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment; therefore, a detailed
analysis of the line of cases establishing the third-party doctrine is
necessary in order to evaluate the third-party doctrine under the later
Katz test. The result of the analysis of the third-party doctrine’s
lineage shows that an “all or nothing” approach to the third-party
doctrine is inextricably attached to the trespass doctrine. Thus, the
Katz test demands a retooling of the third-party doctrine.
The Supreme Court first recognized the third-party doctrine
in Gouled v. United States.106 In Gouled, the United States Army
suspected that the defendant was part of a conspiracy to defraud the
government through contracts for clothing and equipment, so it sent
an undercover private to obtain information from the defendant.107
The private, a former business acquaintance of the defendant,
travelled to the defendant’s office for a “friendly” visit.108 The
defendant allowed the private to enter his office; when the defendant
momentarily stepped out, the private took and carried away several
documents from the defendant.109 The private did not have a
warrant.110 The government used the seized documents as evidence
at trial, which ultimately resulted in the defendant’s conviction.111
On appeal, the defendant argued that the private’s
warrantless seizure of his documents violated his Fourth
Amendment rights, and that the court should have suppressed that
evidence at trial.112 The Supreme Court agreed with the defendant,
finding that it was significant that the private took the papers outside
the presence of the defendant.113 The Court reasoned that a secret
taking of an object, despite being voluntarily invited into office, is
analogous to a forced or coerced entry and seizure prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment.114 In its conclusion, the Supreme Court
declared:
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Note, If These Walls Could Talk, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1931 (2017).
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[w]hether entrance to the home or office of a person
suspected of crime be obtained by a representative .
. . of the government . . . and whether the owner be
present or not when he enters, any search and seizure
subsequently and secretly made in his absence, falls
within the scope of the prohibition of the Fourth
Amendment . . . . 115
This ruling, while favorable for the defendant, implicitly endorsed
governmental subterfuge. The Court’s endorsement came from the
Court’s pure reliance on the voluntariness of the defendant’s
actions.116 In this case, the idea of voluntariness only manifested
when the private took the papers outside of the defendant’s presence
because the defendant was not present to give consent, and the Court
assumed that he would not have if he were.117 The fact that the
private gained the defendant’s permission to enter the office under
false pretenses was of no regard—that still counted as voluntary
consent.118
Seven years later, in Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme
Court emphasized voluntariness and trespass as a part of Fourth
Amendment considerations.119 In Olmstead, the government
suspected that the defendant was involved in a “conspiracy of
amazing magnitude”120 to violate the National Prohibition Act.121
The government wiretapped the defendant’s home and office
telephones without a warrant to conduct its investigation.122 The
government accomplished this by attaching wires to the telephone
lines across the street from his home and in the basement below the
defendant’s office.123 The government was thus able to listen to the
defendant’s conversations without any act of trespass.124 Therefore,
115

Id. at 306 (emphasis added).
See id.
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the government used evidence gained from the wiretaps in the
defendant’s trial which lead to his conviction.125
On appeal, the defendant argued that the government’s
warrantless interception of his private conversations violated the
Fourth Amendment.126 The Supreme Court held that the defendant’s
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated because the government
did not trespass upon his property or seize any physical objects.127
In addition to a lack of physical trespass or seizure, the Court
regarded the voluntariness of the defendant’s conversations as an
essential consideration: “Here we have testimony only of voluntary
conversations secretly overheard.”128 The Court viewed that a “wellknown historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment” is to prevent
the government from compelling suspects to agree to searches or
seizures against their will.129 Without government coercion, the
defendant’s conversations were voluntary.130
Therefore, the Court built upon Gouled by allowing for more
than knowing and voluntary disclosure, but also for a defendant’s
complete unawareness of the eavesdropping of another party.
Unlike the Court in Gouled, the Court in Olmstead did not assume
what the defendant would have done had he known the government
was listening to his conversations.131 This distinction highlights the
connection of voluntariness to a physical location or tangible object.
Without trespass, the Court assumed voluntariness.132
The Supreme Court further expanded this “voluntariness”
reasoning in the 1960s as it decided a series of Fourth Amendment
cases which evaluated defendants’ statements to undercover
government agents.133 For example, in Lopez, the defendant was
convicted for attempted bribery of an Internal Revenue Service
agent.134 The agent was initially investigating whether the defendant
was evading taxes in the operation of his hotel.135 At the defendant’s
hotel, the agent asked the defendant if the hotel provided
entertainment in the evenings, such as singing or dancing.136 The
defendant stated the hotel did not.137 But when the agent returned
later that same evening and again the next day, the agent discovered
125
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that the hotel was indeed hosting dancing.138 The agent again
confronted the defendant, stating that he believed that the defendant
might be liable for a cabaret tax and requested to inspect the
defendant’s books.139 The defendant took the agent back to his
office and offered the agent $420 to “drop this case.”140
After the bribe, the agent took the money and reported the
event to his supervisor.141 The IRS equipped the agent with a secret
recording device and sent the agent back to the hotel to get the
defendant to discuss the previous bribery event.142 The plan worked;
the agent returned to the hotel and recorded a conversation with the
defendant in which the defendant recognized the previous bribe and
set up a system for continuing payments in order to avoid taxes.143
The court admitted the recording as evidence and allowed
the agent to testify in the trial despite the defendant’s objections
under the Fourth Amendment, which led to the defendant’s
conviction.144 The defendant appealed, and the issue reached the
Supreme Court.145 The Supreme Court decided that admission of the
recording at trial did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment
rights.146 Similar to the Court in Olmstead, the Supreme Court
employed the trespass doctrine for its analysis.147 The court held that
the agent did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights
because the defendant invited the agent into his office and because
the agent did not furtively seize any evidence.148 The Supreme Court
specifically harkened back to Gouled and emphaisized that the
linchpin of its holding was trespass, not the nature of the defendant’s
statement.149 Therefore, the recording and the fact that the defendant
likely would not have made any incriminating statements had he
known of the recording were immaterial in the Supreme Court’s
decision.150
The Supreme Court subsequently expanded the Lopez
principles simultaneously in Hoffa v. United States and United
States v. Lewis by disregarding whether the defendant knew the true
identity of the listener.151 Put another way, the third-party doctrine
now allowed for the government’s intentional deception of the
138
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defendant. The facts in Hoffa begin with the defendant on trial for
violation of the Taft-Hartley Act.152 During the trial, the defendant
stayed in a hotel suite and was frequently visited by two
associates.153 The defendant had voluntary conversations with the
associates in multiple locations around the site of the trial.154 During
the conversations, the defendant discussed his efforts to bribe the
jurors in his trial.155 However, unbeknownst to the defendant, one of
the associates was reporting the contents of their conversations to a
federal agent.156 In fact, the reporting associate was acting as a
government agent.157
With this information, the government indicted the
defendant for attempting to bribe jurors.158 The court admitted that
the reporting associate’s disclosures and testimony at the
defendant’s trial “unquestionably contribut[ed]” to the defendant’s
conviction.159 The defendant appealed his conviction and argued
that the court violated the Fourth Amendment when it admitted the
evidence derived from the reporting associate in his trial.160 More
specifically, the defendant called upon the Supreme Court to
determine whether the reporting associate’s “failure to disclose his
role as a government informer vitiated the consent that [the
defendant] gave to [the reporting associate’s] repeated entries into
the suite, and that by listening to [his] statements [the reporting
associate] conducted an illegal ‘search’ for verbal evidence.”161 The
Supreme Court found the defendant’s argument that his voluntary
statements to and around the associate unconvincing.162 The
defendant “was not relying on the security of the hotel room; he was
relying on his misplaced confidence that [the reporting associate]
would not reveal his wrongdoing.”163 Citing Lopez, the Supreme
Court affirmed that the Fourth Amendment does not “protect[] a
wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily
152
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confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”164 Indeed, the Supreme
Court went as far as to quote the Lopez opinion’s reasoning, which
cited Gouled, to highlight that the associate did not seize anything
not freely given to him: “He was in the office with [the defendant’s]
consent, and while there [the reporting associate] did not violate the
privacy of the office by seizing something surreptitiously without
petitioner’s knowledge.”165
The Supreme Court released its opinion in Lewis v. United
States the same day as Hoffa, emphasizing its holding that
government subterfuge does not make a statement involuntary.166 In
Lewis, the defendant invited an undercover law enforcement officer
into his home and sold the agent unlawful narcotics.167 The trial
court convicted the defendant because he violated various narcotics
laws in a trial where his interactions with the undercover officer
were admitted into evidence over his objection.168 On appeal, the
defendant argued that the admission of such evidence violated his
Fourth Amendment rights because he could not have waived his
privacy protections inside his home when he invited the officer
inside because “the invitation was induced by fraud and
deception.”169
However, the Supreme Court disagreed.170 The Supreme
Court noted that the “pretense resulted in no breach of privacy” and
focused on the defendant’s voluntary statements and the defendant
freely invited the officer into his home.171 Further the Supreme
Court noted that pretense “merely encouraged the [defendant] to say
things which he was willing and anxious to say to anyone who
would be interested in purchasing [narcotics].”172
This line of cases shows that up until 1966, the Supreme
Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment as only protecting
unreasonable physical trespass and seizures. The third-party
doctrine emerged under this interpretation. On these terms,
voluntariness was a defendant-centric inquiry. The Court did not
evaluate whether the defendant knew he was speaking to a
government agent or whether one was secretly listening. Then, the
Katz test was created and undercut the line of cases behind the thirdparty doctrine.
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2. Emergence of the Katz Test
The Supreme Court recognized a different Fourth
Amendment paradigm in Katz v. United States when it held that the
Fourth Amendment protects people but does not protect places.173
Under this new standard, Justice Harlan articulated the test that
would henceforth guide Fourth Amendment inquiry.174 As this case
displaced the trespass doctrine, the Supreme Court also redefined
the third-party doctrine as it was then understood.
In Katz, the defendant was convicted in federal court for
various crimes after he “transmit[ted] wagering information by
telephone” across state lines.175 The trial court allowed the
government to introduce recordings of the defendant’s end of a
telephone conversation into evidence despite the defendant’s
objection, which contributed to the defendant’s conviction.176 The
government obtained the defendant’s conversation by placing “an
electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public
telephone booth from which he had placed his calls.”177
Following conviction, the defendant appealed, contending
that the government’s listening and recording of his phonebooth
conversation violated his Fourth Amendment rights.178 The Court of
Appeals disagreed; it held that the government did not violate the
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights because the government did
not “physical[ly enter] into the area occupied by” the defendant.179
The defendant then appealed to the Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari.180 At the Supreme Court, the defendant argued
that a public telephone booth was a constitutionally protected area
and that physical penetration was necessary before the government
violated the Fourth Amendment.181 In essence, the defendant
challenged the trespass doctrine.
Initially, the Supreme Court took exception to the
defendant’s formulation of the issues.182 The Supreme Court
rejected both the defendant’s and the government’s strict reliance on
the physical location of the putative search because such analysis
was not a “talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment
problem.”183 Instead, the Supreme Court declared that “[w]hat a
173
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person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. . . . But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected.”184
The Supreme Court applied these principles and concluded
that the defendant’s actions demonstrated that he sought to preserve
his privacy.185 The government argued that the defendant could not
have expected any privacy because phone booths are made out of
glass, but the court couched the defendant’s privacy expectation in
terms of audio privacy.186 Specifically, the court held that the
defendant had an expectation that his conversation would be private
because he shut the phonebooth door behind himself and paid the
toll to make his call.187
Then, the Supreme Court then considered whether Fourth
Amendment searches require the government’s physical presence
during a search.188 Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized that its
previous jurisprudence limited Fourth Amendment application to
instances of the government’s physical trespass and seizure of
material items, specifically citing Olmstead and Goldman.189
However, the Court also recognized that such an approach had
“been discredited.”190 The Supreme Court accomplished this by
citing Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, which recognized that
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has decoupled from the commonlaw understanding of property to the broader concept of personal
privacy.191 As such, the Supreme Court announced that the so-called
“trespass doctrine” was no longer valid.192
Thus, the Supreme Court disregarded the absence of the
government’s physical presence in the phonebooth and concluded
that the government violated the defendant’s justified expectation of
privacy while using the phonebooth.193 Therefore, the government’s
electronic eavesdropping on the defendant constituted a “search and
seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because of
the defendant’s reasonable privacy expectation.194 In finding that the
government’s actions constituted a “search and seizure” under the
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court ultimately held that
184
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eavesdropping on the defendant was unreasonable because the
government failed to get a warrant and no exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement existed.195
Beyond the facts of the case, Katz became significant for
Justice Harlan’s test to judge whether a government action
constitutes a Fourth Amendment “search and seizure.”196 Precisely,
Justice Harlan stated that his “understanding of the rule that has
emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement,
first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”197 Henceforth, Justice
Harlan’s “Katz test” became the controlling interpretation of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.198
Looking at the reasoning of Katz, the principles underlying
the third-party doctrine were necessarily shaken. First, the Court
expressly renounced the trespass doctrine. The government could
now be found to have violated the Fourth Amendment without any
physical trespass or seizure. Secondly, the Court’s reasoning
overruled any case stating that the government could eavesdrop on
a defendant through wiretaps and without the use of a confederate,
such as in Olmstead. Furthermore, in the bigger picture, the thirdparty doctrine could no longer be viewed as a binary, all or nothing
analysis because the Katz test requires an evaluation of what the
defendant and society would deem to be reasonably private,
regardless of how the defendant made the statement. Unfortunately,
the Supreme Court struggled to fully apply the Katz test in the cases
preceding Miller, falling back upon old conceptions of the Fourth
Amendment instead.
3. Early Tension Between The Katz Test And The ThirdParty Doctrine
The Supreme Court struggled to harmonize Katz with the
third-party doctrine in subsequent cases.199 In United States v.
White, the Court failed to analyze the third-party doctrine under the
Katz test; rather, it reapplied the third-party doctrine as
conceptualized under the trespass doctrine.200 In White, the
government was investigating a defendant for illegal drug
transactions.201 To gather incriminating evidence on the defendant,
195
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the government used an informant who had several conversations
with the defendant regarding illegal drug transactions.202 The
locations of these conversations included a restaurant, a car, the
informant’s home, and the defendant’s home.203 During all of these
conversations, the informant was secretly wearing a radio
transmitter that allowed government agents to listen to the
conversations through radio equipment in real-time.204 The
conversations that took place at the informant’s home were also
listened to by an agent concealed in a closed kitchen (with the
informant’s consent).205
When it came time for trial, the government could not locate
and produce the informant as a witness.206 Instead, the government
introduced the testimony of the agents who had listened to the
defendant’s conversations via the radio transmitter.207 The
defendant objected to the agents’ testimonies which the court
overruled.208 At the end of the trial, the jury found the defendant
guilty.209
The defendant appealed his conviction on the ground that the
agents’ testimonies violated his Fourth Amendment rights.210 The
Court of Appeals ruled that the agents’ statements were inadmissible
under the principles outlined in Katz.211 The court stated that there
was no substantive legal difference between the bug used in Katz
and an informant wearing a wire.212 However, the Court of Appeals
reasoned by analogy to Katz rather than employing the Katz test.213
In doing so, the court held that Katz stands for the per se rule that all
covert, warrantless eavesdropping by the government violates the
Fourth Amendment.214 Additionally, the court concluded that the
listener’s consent was “irrelevant.”215 The court emphasized that the
Fourth Amendment required such a rule for efficacy:
That amendment's search and seizure protection is
lost to a person when his actions as a matter of law
can be said to constitute a waiver of his right. Since
the Fourth Amendment protects a speaker's right to
202
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privacy, this right would be illusory if it could be
waived by other individuals.216
In this sentence, the Court of Appeals took Katz as obliterating the
third-party doctrine without using the Katz test in its analysis.217
The Supreme Court took a position opposite that of the Court
of Appeals, holding that Katz did not implicate the third-party
doctrine whatsoever because the defendant could neither show that
he had any constitutionally protected right to expect, nor prevent
those to whom he spoketo not later reveal that converstion to the
police.218
In analyzing the issue, the Supreme Court considered the
third-party doctrine and traced it through Hoffa, Lewis, and Lopez,
and determined that these cases “remained unaffected by Katz
[sic].”219 The Court took those cases as creating a per se rule that a
person can never have an expectation of privacy in the information
disclosed to another;220 though on its surface, it appeared as if the
Court used the Katz test to reach this decision. However, the Court’s
opinion was actually driven by the trespass doctrine version of the
third-party doctrine, which only analyzes the volition of the
defendant’s statements in the absence of a physical search or
seizure.
This is seen in how the Court viewed the defendant’s thought
process in sharing information with a third party:
If he sufficiently doubts their trustworthiness, the
association will very probably end or never
materialize. But if he has no doubts, or allays them,
or risks what doubt he has, the risk is his. In terms of
what his course will be, what he will or will not do
or say, we are unpersuaded that he would distinguish
between probably informers on the one hand and
probable informers with transmitters on the other.221
But, this hypothetical thought process leaves no room for a person
to share information and retain a privacy expectation in that
information. The Court in White focused on the defendant’s free will
whether to share was determinative—the binary choice associated
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with the trespass doctrine, not the Katz test. Upon this reasoning,222
the Court held that the government did not violate the defendant’s
Fourth Amendment rights and denied his motion. 223
Thus, White laid the groundwork for the Supreme Court to
adhere to the trespass doctrine version of the third-party doctrine
despite the Katz decision. To the extent that the Court’s decision was
result-driven, the Court could have fully performed the Katz test in
White to find that the defendant had no expectation of privacy.
Society would unlikely accept a defendant’s expectation of privacy
in a conversation with a police informant as reasonable in that
limited context and for the public good. Unfortunately, the Court’s
flawed reasoning laid the groundwork for future faulty decisions. By
using the third-party doctrine as valid per se rule, the Court left room
for the possibility that society could consider a privacy expectation
in the information given to a third party to be reasonable in
circumstances substantially different from those in White. Indeed,
that is what happened when the Court decided the constitutionality
of the BSA.
B. The Supreme Court Applies the Third-Party Doctrine to
the Bank Secrecy Act
Finally, in 1976, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to
evaluate the BSA in light of the relatively new Katz test.
Unfortunately, the Court only gave a cursory nod to the Katz test
and reverted back to the pre-Katz conception of the third-party
doctrine224 from the case of U.S. v. Miller.225 In Miller, law
enforcement’s ultimate warrantless search of the defendant’s bank
records stemmed from when the defendant first came to law
enforcement’s attention.226 That attention came as a consequence of
an informant’s tip to law enforcement, which led to a traffic stop of
two of the defendant’s co-conspirators.227 During the stop, law
enforcement found illegal distillery equipment and raw materials in
the vehicle.228 A few weeks later, a warehouse rented to the
defendant caught on fire, and during the response to the fire, law
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enforcement found “a[n illegal] 7,500-gallon-capacity distillery,
175 gallons of nontax-paid whiskey, and related paraphernalia.”229
As law enforcement officials investigated the defendant,
they issued grand jury subpoenas to the presidents of two separate
banks where the defendant maintained accounts.230 The particular
subpoenas used in this case were issued in blank by the clerk of the
trial court and completed by the United States Attorney’s office.231
These subpoenas required the bank presidents to appear before the
grand jury on a specific date and produce “all records of accounts, i.
e., savings, checking, loan or otherwise, in the name of” the
defendant from approximately two months prior through the
present.232 The banks already kept the requested records under the
requirements of 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d).233 The bank presidents
provided the requested information to law enforcement and were
therefore excused from appearing before the grand jury.234
Throughout this process, the banks never notified the defendant
about the subpoenas.235
Eventually, the grand jury indicted the defendant for various
financial crimes and the defendant’s case went to trial.236 At trial,
the defendant moved to suppress the documents provided by the
bank presidents, arguing that they were illegally seized because they
were the product of a non-judicially ordered subpoena.237 The trial
court denied the defendant’s motion, but the Court of Appeals
reversed.238 The Court of Appeals held that the defendant had a
Fourth Amendment privacy interest in the bank records.239 As such,
the subpoena violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights for
not being obtained through an “adequate ‘legal process.’”240 The
government then appealed the case to the Supreme Court.241
In its decision, the Supreme Court ultimately held that “there
was no intrusion into any area in which [the defendant] had a
protected Fourth Amendment interest,” and thus reversed the Court
of Appeals.242 The Supreme Court began its analysis by affirming
the Court of Appeals’s holding that “‘no interest legitimately
protected by the Fourth Amendment’ is implicated by governmental
229
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investigative activities unless there is an intrusion into a zone of
privacy, into ‘the security a man relies upon when he places himself
or his property within a constitutionally protected area.’”243 The
Supreme Court diverged from the Court of Appeals in its belief that
the bank documents did not “fall within a protected zone of
privacy.”244
“On its face,” the Supreme Court said the bank documents
were not the defendant’s “private papers” because they were the
business records of the banks.245 Although the records contained
personally identifiable information of the defendant, the records
belonged to the banks because the banks created the records
themselves as a party in the defendant’s banking transactions.246 As
the Court put it, the banks had a “substantial stake” in dealing with
negotiable instruments with the defendant.247
The Supreme Court also rejected the defendant’s argument
that the unique combination of the BSA’s recordkeeping
requirements and the government’s access to those records through
a subpoena was “the functional equivalent of a search and seizure”
of his “private papers,” thus implicating his Fourth Amendment
rights as if the government sought the bank records” directly from
his custody.248 The Supreme Court framed this issue as “whether the
compulsion embodied in the [BSA] as exercised in this case creates
a Fourth Amendment interest in the depositor where none existed
before.”249
Disposing of the defendant’s argument, the court gave a
passing nod to the Katz test by parroting the rule’s language in the
context of what the defendant was arguing.250 However, the
Supreme Court immediately countered that Katz “also stressed that
‘[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not subject
of Fourth Amendment protection.”251 The Court further included the
rule that it is necessary to “examine the nature of the particular
documents sought to be protected in order to determine whether
there is a legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’ concerning their
contents.”252
Under these rules, the Court only looked to the second part
of the Katz test—whether society would recognize a privacy
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expectation in bank records as being reasonable.253 The Supreme
Court answered in the negative by looking to the third-party doctrine
as well as the pronouncements of Congress. For the third-party
doctrine, the Court looked primarily to White and its predecessor
cases, stating,
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed
by him to Government authorities, even if the
information is revealed on the assumption that it will
be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence
placed in the third party will not be betrayed.254
In this, “The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to
another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the
Government.”255
In regard to Congressional intent, the Court justified a
societal lack of expectation of privacy in bank records through the
mere existence of the BSA.256 Explaining Congress’s intent, the
Court articulated,
The lack of any legitimate expectation of privacy
concerning the information kept in bank records was
assumed by Congress in enacting the Bank Secrecy
Act, the expressed purpose of which is to require
records to be maintained because they “have a high
degree of usefulness in criminal tax, and regulatory
investigations and proceedings.”257
Further, neither did the Courtbelieve that the BSA’s record-keeping
mandate impacted its Fourth Amendment analysis.258 Here, the
Court first avowed that such requirements do not transform the
banks into government agents.259 The Court then said that even if it
were to consider the banks as “acting solely as Government agents,”
there would still be no Fourth Amendment violation because the
banks recorded the information and provided it pursuant to the
subpoena “without protests.”260
253
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In the end, the Court held that the BSA did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. In its reasoning, the Court relied on the
trespass-doctrine formulation of the third-party doctrine as well as
wrongly deferring to congressional opinion. Because of these errors,
the constitutionality of the BSA must be reevaluated.
C. Criticism of the Supreme Court’s Opinion
In Miller, the Supreme Court’s analysis erred in two
respects: (1) it did not apply the Katz test to its rightful extent, but
reverting to outmoded concepts of the third-party doctrine, and (2)
let Congress define constitutional law. Without these errors, the
Court would have likely held that the BSA violated the Fourth
Amendment. At a minimum, these flaws should cause Miller to have
little precedential value.
First, the Court failed to reconcile the third-party doctrine
with the Katz test. As discussed in section III.A.1, the third-party
doctrine evolved out of the Court’s trespass doctrine. The strict
policy supporting the trespass doctrine was that if an individual does
not control a location or relinquishes control of a location by inviting
the government in, then that individual can expect no Fourth
Amendment privacy rights. This reasoning has necessarily
influenced the third-party doctrine—by relinquishing control of a
piece of information, an individual can no longer expect any control
over that information.
It was the trespass doctrine-based understanding of the thirdparty doctrine that the Supreme Court applied in Miller. The Court
first showed its use when it quoted Hoffa to analyze the
constitutionality of the BSA—that there is no Fourth Amendment
violation unless the government violates “the security a man relies
upon when he places himself or his property within a
constitutionally protected area.”261 This pre-Katz language focuses
Fourth Amendment protections on locations, the hallmark of the
trespass doctrine.262 Next, the Court emphasized that the banks had
possession of the records supplied to the government. Again, this is
a trespass doctrine-based analysis because it looks solely to the
physical location and ownership of records.263 This analysis is a
direct appeal to the traditional third-party doctrine because it asserts
that the defendant could not have privacy interest in the information
that he voluntarily gave to the banks.
Still, the Supreme Court purported to apply the Katz test, but
it did so in name only.264 The Court merely restated that the bank
261
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documents “contain[ed] only information voluntarily conveyed to
banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of
business,” rather than asking the right Katz question: Does society
expect privacy in bank records?265 Finally, the Court solidified its
trespass doctrine-based third-party doctrine analysis by string-citing
White, Hoffa, and Lopez.266 From these cases, the Court struck the
final blow to the defendant:
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs
to another, that the information will be conveyed by
that person to the Government. . . . This Court has
held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a
third party and conveyed by him to Government
authorities, even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party
will not be betrayed.267
Therefore, as seen by the cases it cited and the analyses it utilized,
the Supreme Court applied the third-party doctrine under the
trespass-doctrine of the Fourth Amendment.
If the Court looked at the third-party doctrine though the lens
of the Katz test, it would have seen that the strictness of the thirdparty doctrine has eroded. Under the Katz paradigm, “the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places.”268 Moreover, while an
individual may still lose Fourth Amendment protection in
information purposefully exposed to third parties, “what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.”269 By asking if the defendant exhibits a
subjective privacy interest that society would objectively recognize
as reasonable (the Katz test), it is evident that there is room for
privacy in the information disclosed to third-parties. Yet, the
Supreme Court in Miller did not go into this particular analysis.
By not recognizing the full extent of the Katz test, the Court
failed to analyze its specific components. Indeed, the Supreme Court
only touched upon societal expectations while discussing subpoena
requirements, not Katz’s substantive analysis.270 Specifically, the
Supreme Court stated,
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Many banks traditionally kept permanent records of
their depositors' accounts, although not all banks did
so and the practice was declining in recent years. By
requiring that such records be kept by all banks, the
Bank Secrecy Act is not a novel means designed to
circumvent established Fourth Amendment rights. It
is merely an attempt to facilitate the use of a proper
and longstanding law enforcement technique by
insuring that records are available when they are
needed.271
However, this statement does not explain why banks were moving
away from keeping permanent records of their customers. Perhaps
it was merely for procedural efficiency; perhaps it was because
customers considered such records a privacy threat. Moreover, the
Court’s statement only looks back at past practices but not current,
and potentially different, realities. Regardless, this is not sufficient
analysis for the Katz test.
Second, the Supreme Court erred by interpreting the pure
existence of the BSA as relevant to its constitutional analysis.
Allowing statutes to determine constitutional law is anathema to the
American system. As stated in Marbury v. Madison, “the particular
phraseology of the Constitution of the United States confirms and
strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written
constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void . . . .”272
This has been a fundamental principle throughout the United States’
existence. As the Supreme Court stated much later in 1997,
“Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what
that right is. It has been given the power ‘to enforce,’ not the power
to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.”273 Stated
plainly, Congress does not decide what is constitutional, the
Supreme Court does.
However, that is what the Supreme Court allowed when it
called to congressional intent to justify a lack of privacy interests in
bank documents:
The lack of any legitimate expectation of privacy
concerning the information kept in bank records was
assumed by Congress in enacting the Bank Secrecy
Act, the expressed purpose of which is to require
records to be maintained because they “have a high
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degree of usefulness in criminal tax, and regulatory
investigations and proceedings.”274
The Court’s line of reasoning here is inappropriate because it allows
Congress to dictate citizens’ Fourth Amendment protections. This
system is akin to the fox in the henhouse analogy because Congress
could abrogate any Fourth Amendment protection by merely
passing a statute declaring that individuals no longer have a privacy
interest in the subject matter.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court began this line of thinking
regarding the BSA not in Miller, but three years earlier in Shultz.
While describing the “sweeping” effect of the BSA in Shultz, the
Court said,
While an Act conferring such broad authority over
transactions such as these might well surprise or even
shock those who lived in an earlier era, the latter did
not live to see the time when bank accounts would
join chocolate, cheese, and watches as a symbol of
the Swiss economy. Nor did they live to see the
heavy utilization of our domestic banking system by
the minions of organized crime as well as by millions
of legitimate businessmen.275
Here, the court implied that individuals should give up privacy for
the sake of criminal investigations.
These errors in reasoning call into doubt the Court’s holding
in Miller. If the Court avoided these errors, it may have determined
that the BSA was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment—
or at least it would have been a much closer case. Either way, these
errors severely limit Miller’s precedential value and calls for the
Court to revisit the issue. In 2017, ruling that the BSA in its current
form violates the Fourth Amendment seems unavoidable.
Nevertheless, such a ruling would not necessarily ring the
BSA’s death-bell; it only means that the BSA is unconstitutional to
the extent that it allows the government to collect personal
information to investigate criminal acts, determined by a Katz
analysis, without a warrant. The Court would have to strike
provisions such as the mandatory reporting of SARs for the BSA to
be constitutional. Further, any information-collecting portions of the
BSA that are not specifically geared towards criminal investigation
would not even fall under the purview of the Fourth Amendment in
the first place.276
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REEVALUATING THE BSA UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE MODERN ERA

Regardless of whether the Supreme Court correctly decided
Miller in 1976, society has since sufficiently changed to demand that
the Supreme Court now overturn Miller. Particularly in the digital
age, the third-party doctrine should not operate to deny Fourth
Amendment protection of banking information categorically. “It
would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to
citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by
the advances of technology.”277 The expectation that Fourth
Amendment protections can change over time is supported by how
the Supreme Court describes its Katz decision as a rejection of a
“mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment” because “that
approach would leave [individuals] at the mercy of advancing
technology . . . ”278 Under this approach to constitutionally protected
privacy rights, the Supreme Court should not rigidly apply Fourth
Amendment doctrines developed in historically dissimilar contexts
in modern cases.
Several realities of modern society and technological
advances support a finding that society has a reasonable expectation
of privacy in banking records. In the modern era, a person’s bank
account can reveal the intimacies of that person’s life.279 As one
scholar has noted, the depth of this information is great:
With access to an individual's financial records,
interested parties can easily determine the groups and
associations to which the individual belongs (e.g.,
through membership dues or contributions) and the
social causes the individual supports (e.g., through
contributions). With access to banking records,
interested parties can identify the books and
publications an individual buys (e.g., through
subscription payments or receipts) and the material
items an individual purchases (e.g., through receipts
or credit charges). Prying eyes with access to bank
records can even identify the political party and
causes supported by the individual (e.g., through

277

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001).
Id. at 35.
279
Matthew N. Kleiman, The Right to Financial Privacy Versus Computerized
Law Enforcement: A New Fight In An Old Battle, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1169, 1176
(1992).
278

170

Seattle J. Tech., Envtl. & Innovation Law

[Vol. 10:1

contributions to an election campaign or to a
lobbying group).280
Moreover, this reasoning is not restricted to that of academics—the
Supreme Court has previously echoed such sentiments.
The Supreme Court has already recognized that it is
precisely this type of information and activity that the Constitution
protects. In National Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v.
State of Ala. ex. rel. Patterson, the Supreme Court reiterated the
“[i]nviolability of privacy in group association may in many
circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of
association, particularly where a group espouses dissident
beliefs.”281 Similarly, in Talley v. California, the Supreme Court
recognized that anonymity in personal participation in political
discourse and activities is necessary to the freedom of people from
governmental tyranny.282 This principle is ingrained in the rise of
our nation—anonymous distribution of literature critical of the
British, which the British considered a criminal act, was part of the
prelude to the Revolutionary War.283 Further, the Supreme Court has
recognized significant privacy expectations barring governmental
intrusion into individuals’ sexual and family lives, such as privacy
in marriage, procreation, family relationships, child-rearing, child
education, possession of pornography in the home, and
contraceptive use.284
Moreover, as the United States moves closer to a cashless
society where all financial transactions are conducted by computer
recordkeeping, debit and credit card transactions can be used to map
an individual’s physical movements.285 This tracking capability can
be expanded to identify groups of people meeting together.286
Under these realities, there are two reasons to hold that the
BSA is unconstitutional. First, banks have become government
agents. In a society that both requires banking and government
disclosure of banking records, banks are de facto arms of the federal
government engaged in continuous surveillance of its citizens.287
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Second, recent financial developments demonstrate that citizens
demand privacy in banking. Specifically, the massive rise of
cryptocurrencies288—a financial mechanism designed to protect
privacy—is society’s revolt against the BSA.
A. To Participate in Society, the BSA Effectively
Requires Individuals to Give the Federal
Government Private Information.
The combination of detailed and vague reporting
requirements for banks within the BSA forces banks to overreport
on the transactions of their customers. This is out of fear of sanctions
for noncompliance. Concurrently, in the modern age, banking is
necessary for individuals to participate in society effectively. The
result of this paradigm requires citizens to give the government free
access to their financial records—such revelations are anything but
voluntary. Consequently, the third-party doctrine under the Katz test
is inapplicable. The Katz test recognizes that the Fourth Amendment
may protect some third-party disclosures. A court cannot hold that
individuals voluntarily relinquish privacy expectations in the
information given to third parties when the government requires
those disclosures.
1. Banks as Government Agents
The Fourth Amendment applies to agents of the federal
government.289 The circuit courts have identified “two critical
factors” in determining whether a private entity acts as a government
agent: “(1) whether the government knew of or acquiesced in the
intrusive conduct, and (2) whether the party performing the search
intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to further his own
ends.”290 The courts also consider other cicrumstances, such as
whether a search is performed at the request of the government or
whether the government offered a reward for the search.291
applicable punishments only serve to bolster the argument that the federal
government has coopted banks as its agents.
288
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Under these rules, the BSA turns banks into government
agents. Not only does the government know banks are keeping
customers’ banking records for use in criminal investigations, but
the government also requires it.292 In this same manner, the banks
are keeping transaction records and sending many of those records,
including SARs, to FinCEN expressly for the criminal-investigation
ends of the BSA.293 To ensure compliance with the BSA, the
government both offersrewards and threatens punishment.294 These
“critical” factors all point to banks as being government agents.
In Shultz, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the
BSA turns banks into government agents.295 The Court reasoned
because the records that the BSA requires banks to keep were
already being kept voluntarily by the banks for their business
purposes and that it is a party in banking transactions, a statute
requiring banks to keep the same records does not transform the
banks into government agents.296 The Supreme Court determined
that this situation was not any different from its prior holding that
the IRS summons directed at banks for records did not violate the
customers’ Fourth Amendment protections.297 Further, in Miller, the
Supreme Court insisted that even if it assumed the banks were acting
as government agents under the BSA, there could be no Fourth
Amendment violation due to the third-party doctrine.298
The Supreme Court’s arguments do not follow. As the
Supreme Court itself admitted in Miller, the banks’ practice of
keeping permanent records was on the decline in recent years.299
Moreover, SARs are reports designed for the benefit of the
government—banks do not create them during standard business
practices of banking.300 Since the BSA requires banks to keep
records they may not have otherwise kept and then requires that the
records be available to the government for criminal investigations,
the BSA squarely imparts government agency onto banks. Banks
acting as government agents is particularly troublesome when
individuals must choose between disclosing information to the
government or forego full participation in society.
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2. No Option but to Bank
Technological progress in modern society gives the public
no option but to hold bank accounts. The third-party doctrine
emerged in a society that was then mostly cash-based. In that
system, an individual did not necessarily have (much less need) a
bank account. It was easier to believe that individuals giving
information to banks were doing so voluntarily. Today, individuals
primarily receive and send payments electronically—an act that
requires banks to function as necessary intermediaries. As
highlighted in Airel’s story,301 it is unduly burdensome to function
in modern society without a bank account.302
The Supreme Court of California recognized the need for
bank accounts in 1975, declaring “[f]or all practical purposes, the
disclosure by individuals or business firms of their financial affairs
to a bank is not entirely volitional since it is impossible to participate
in the economic life of contemporary society without maintaining a
bank account.”303 For those choosing to live without bank accounts,
there are limited options for making and receiving payments. These
options are restricted to using prepaid cards or paper currency, and
each of these options comes with its own disadvantages.304 While
prepaid cards do allow for individuals to make online purchases just
like bank-issued credit and debit cards, money stored in accounts for
prepaid cards are not necessarily insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC).305 One of the requirements for
insurance is that the owner of the prepaid card must be identified.306
For individuals seeking to avoid the BSA’s reporting requirements,
they must forego FDIC insurance as the requisite identification
would result in BSA surveillance.307 Further, assuming the operators
of these prepaid cards are money transmitters, the amount of money
loaded onto the card can itself trigger a required SAR under the
BSA.308
The sole use of paper currency also comes with
disadvantages. First, possessing only paper currency can pose a
safety issue. Homes and people are subject to burglary. Money kept
301
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at home is additionally subject to destruction, such as from fires. If
paper currency is stolen by an unknown individual or destroyed,
there is no getting it back. Even if an individual has a method to
safeguard his or her cash, it still does not accrue interest as it would
when locked in a bank’s vault.
Users of only paper currency are also disadvantaged in
receiving and making payments. Without a bank account and unless
an employer pays in cash, these individuals will require check
cashing services.309 These services typically charge fees above what
one would have to pay when receiving a direct deposit into their
bank account.310 For example, an individual wishing to cash a check
at a non-bank entity is usually charged “between 1.5% and 3.3% of
[the] check’s face value.”311 If that same individual wants to send a
money order, for amounts under $500, that individual will typically
face fees ranging from $0.50 to $10, or up to ten percent of the
money order’s value.312
Likewise, if a debtor, such as a utility company, does not
have a local office that accepts cash payments, the individual must
get and send a money order, which also comes with fees.313
Furthermore, payments made by paper currency do not help improve
an individual’s credit score.314 This is significant because credit
scores do not only affect an individual’s ability to make large
purchases, but employers are entitled to look at credit scores to make
hiring and promotion decisions.315
Still, individuals remain “unbanked.” The FDIC considered
a household to be “unbanked” when “no one in the household had a
checking or savings account.” In response, the Government has
taken multiple steps to get unbanked individuals signed up for
banking services. The Government has been trying this even before
the FDIC began its survey program in 2009 where it tried to quantify
the number of unbanked and underbanked households in the United
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States.316 For example, in 1998, Congress passed the Assets for
Independence Act (AFIA), which provided $125 million in federal
funds to local programs aimed at getting individuals to sign-up for
Individual Development Accounts.317
Statistical analysis on the number of individuals who do not
have bank accounts is a recent development but does provide some
interesting insights. Starting in 2011, The World Bank estimated
that 22% of United States citizens over fifteen years old did not have
a bank account.318 In that same year, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System estimated that 10.8% of United States
citizens were unbanked.319 Four years later in 2015, a national
survey by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) found
that 7% of United States households were unbanked.320 The 2015
survey results demonstrated only a small decrease in unbanked
households since the FDIC’s 2013 survey, and found that 7.7% of
households were unbanked.321
Nevertheless, the 2015 survey also asked the unbanked
individuals why they do not have bank accounts. The following
were respondents most stated reasons: (1) they do not have enough
money to keep in a bank account by 57.4% of respondents, (2)
avoiding banks provides more privacy by 28.5% of respondents, and
(3) they do not trust banks by 28% of respondents.322
The government’s success in this endeavor is demonstrated
by the shrinking numbers of unbanked Americans. However, the
desire for financial privacy is demonstrated by the high number of
316
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unbanked individuals reporting that their unbanked status was due
to privacy concerns and a lack of trust in banks. Technological
advances are allowing these individuals (and even the currently
banked) to take advantage of services traditionally provided by
banks while foregoing the use of banks and incurring lower fees.
The rise of these technologies supports society’s reasonable
expectation for privacy in banking. Of all these technologices,
cryptocurrencies make a particularly strong case.
B. Cryptocurrencies and the Rise Of Privacy Coins
Cryptocurrencies—and the more secrecy-focused “privacy
coins”—provide a large degree of anonymity to their users.323 While
critics of cryptocurrencies argue that they are merely a vehicle for
illegal activity such as money-laundering, cryptocurrency adopters
assert that “embracing privacy and anonymity doesn’t mean you’re
a criminal; it just simply means that you’re redeeming your rights to
have absolute control over your own privacy.324 If this is the case,
the BSA cannot survive the Katz test.
1. Cryptocurrency Technology and Privacy Coins
FinCEN defines “currency” as “the coin and paper money of
the United States or of any other country that [i] is designated as
legal tender and that [ii] circulates and [iii] is customarily used as a
medium of exchange in the country of issuance.”325 Conversely,
FinCEN defines “virtual” currency as “a medium of exchange that
operates like a currency in some environments but does not have all
the attributes of real currency. Virtual currency does not have legal
tender status in any jurisdiction.”326 Cryptocurrencies fall under the
latter category as they are a type of encrypted, electronic semicurrencies that act as a medium of exchange in a largely anonymous
environment. The public’s rapidly increasing adoption of
cryptocurrencies is a significant sign that individuals want—and in
practice, expect—privacy in their financial transactions.
323

Tom Wilson, Explainer: ‘Privacy coin’ Monero Offers Near Total Anonymity,
REUTERS (May 14, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-crypto-currenciesaltcoins-explainer/explainer-privacy-coin-monero-offers-near-total-anonymityidUSKCN1SL0F0 [https://perma.cc/2KG5-59DW].
324
Aziz, Guide on Privacy Coins: Comparison of Anonymous Cryptocurrencies,
MASTER THE CRYPTO, https://masterthecrypto.com/privacy-coins-anonymouscryptocurrencies/ [https://perma.cc/9F97-AK5T].
325
Application of FinCEN's Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging,
or Using Virtual Currencies, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (Mar. 18,
2013), https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-regulations/guidance/
application-fincens-regulations-persons-administering
[https://perma.cc/5AY9-8WH9] (quoting 31 CFR § 1010.100(m)).
326
Id.

2020]

Seattle J. Tech., Envtl. & Innovation Law

177

The first major cryptocurrency introduced to the public was
Bitcoin in 2009, and as of 2019, it remains the most valuable
cryptocurrency on the market.327 Bitcoin, like all other
cryptocurrencies, is a virtual currency that only exists in electronic
form.328 Cryptocurrencies are unique in that financial transactions
are not recorded in a central location, and users’ identities are kept
anonymous.329 Rather, the transactions are processed and logged on
a decentralized public ledger—many independent computers and
servers working in parallel, each keeping a separate, immutable
copy of each transaction.330 These independent computers and
servers are incentivized to lending their processing power to this
system by having a chance to earn fees for their participation.331
On the users’ end, cryptocurrency transfers may be made
without having to reveal any personally identifiable information.332
The transactions recorded on the public ledger only include the
amounts involved in that transaction and an equivalent of an account
number for each party involved.333 These account numbers are a
randomly generated set of numbers and letters—they do not in and
of themselves identify the account’s owner.334 However, because the
ledger is public, account numbers are available to anyone so inclined
to look up a particular account’s full history of money sent and
received.335 Thus, a user risks identification by using
cryptocurrencies to purchase traceable goods, which then can reveal
that users’ entire transactional history.336 Several alternative
cryptocurrencies have emerged to solve this identification problem.
Improving upon this privacy, several cryptocurrencies have
been developed to ensure anonymity in cryptocurrency-based
financial transactions; these cryptocurrencies have earned the
moniker “privacy coins.”337 Notable privacy coins include Monero,
327
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Zcash, Dash, Verge, PIVX, and Hush, each taking advantage of
different technologies to shield their users’ identities.338 For
example, Monero arguably offers the highest degree of financial
anonymity.339 In a brief explanation of its technologies, Monero
uses Ring Confidential Transactions (RCT) and Stealth Addresses
to mask the accounts of both senders and receivers as well as the
amount involved.340 RCT anonymizes the identities of senders by
comingling a number of senders for any one particular transaction,
so it is impossible to distinguish the actual sender for a particular
transaction.341
Further, RCT hides the actual amount being sent by
requiring the sender to transfer more than required and receiving
back the excess amount as “change.”342 This is done through “a
cryptographic proof that the sum of the input amounts is the same
as the sum of the output amounts, without revealing the actual
numbers.”343 Finally, the Stealth Address component of Monero
works by publishing the sender’s side of a transaction on the
blockchain—the receiver is not specified.344 Rather, each transfer is
routed to a unique, one-time-use address on the blockchain.345 A
receiver wishing to use the received money gains a one-use private
key to identify his or her funds on the public ledger and send them
to a new address.346 This whole process is done without the receiver
ever having to publish any information on the publicly-viewable
ledger.347 The technology advanced by Monero is but one example
of innovation looking to keep financial transactions private.
2. Cryptocurrencies As A Sign Of Expectations To
Privacy In Financial Transactions
While some try, estimating the number of cryptocurrency
holders is difficult.348 Still, the explosive growth of cryptocurrencies
in such a short time and on a global scale is a sign that individuals
are seeking financial privacy. Certainly, other factors, such as price
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speculation, have contributed to the rise of cryptocurrencies,349 but
the promise of financial privacy cannot be overlooked—privacy was
one of Bitcoin’s founding principles after all.350
On a global scale, Bitcoin’s number of users has drastically
increased over the past five years.351 In January 2015, there were
approximately 2.8 million users; by the end of 2019, that number
was approaching 50 million.352 For all types of cryptocurrencies, a
2017 University of Cambridge, Judge Business School study
estimated that there are between 2.9 million and 5.8 million unique
cryptocurrency users.353 Yet, even since the release of this study, the
number of cryptocurrency users are likely to drastically increase as
cryptocurrency exchanges report ever-growing numbers of
accounts. After the Cambridge study was released, Coinbase, one of
the world’s biggest cryptocurrency exchanges, announced that on a
single day it saw the registration of 40,000 additional customers.354
Even ancillary services for cryptocurrencies are emerging. For
example, by September 1, 2019, there were 3,571 Bitcoin ATMs
located in the United States.355 Monero has seen gains even more
impressive than Bitcoin. In 2016, the price of Bitcoin doubled; that
same year, the price of Monero grew by 2,760%.356
The trend towards cryptocurrencies is undeniable and there
is a proven market for privacy coins. Individuals require banking
services, but those services disclose private financial information to
the government because of the BSA. If need is the mother of all
inventions, the rise of cryptocurrencies shows that society is trying
349
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to reclaim financial privacy. Under the Katz test, this means that
society recognizes financial privacy as reasonable, thus, requiring
the BSA conform with Fourth Amendment principles. A
foundational principle of the Fourth Amendment is that warrantless
searches and seizures are unreasonable. The BSA allows the
government to obtain financial information from banks in the
absence of a warrant. Accordingly, the BSA violates the Fourth
Amendment.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court should reevaluate the BSA under the
Fourth Amendment and provide a robust Katz-test analysis. In
Miller, the Court erroneously reasoned that the BSA’s reporting
requirements did not violate Fourth Amendment privacy
expectations. The court erred by misinterpreting the line of cases
creating the third-party doctrine and therefore applied the rule as
constructed under the overruled trespass-doctrine. This error has
caused the Court to view an individual’s disclosure of information
to a third party as a bright-line rule: because individuals voluntarily
provide information to banks, they forfeit any privacy expectation
in that information. Instead, the Court should have given full
consideration to the Katz test, which allows for the possibility of
Fourth Amendment protection over information shared with third
parties.
Regardless of the Court’s decision in Miller, the Katz test
open parameters provide changing Fourth Amendment protections
over time. Applying the Katz test to the BSA in the modern era
shows that the BSA is unconstitutional. Certainly, society should
recognize an individual’s privacy expectation in banking
information as reasonable. The individual is not strictly
“voluntarily” providing that information to his or her bank because
the burden of living without a bank account is extreme. Moreover,
the rise of cryptocurrencies is an indicator that society expects
privacy in banking information. A central vision of cryptocurrencies
is user anonymity and autonomy in financial information. Society’s
desire for anonymity and autonomy excludes its acceptance of the
BSA. Therefore, the Supreme Court should take the opportunity to
reexamine the BSA and hold that its reporting requirements violate
the Fourth Amendment.

